RAY KRESEK began his career in Fire in 1954, as a firefighter, lookout, and later as a state fire warden for the Washington Dept of Natural Resources for 5 years. He served 4 years with the U.S. Air Force Fire Dept, in aircraft crash rescue; earned college degrees in Forestry and Fire Science; and retired after serving 25 years with the Spokane Fire Dept, as an Engine company officer for 18 years. He was a fire equipment contractor for 20 years, pioneering the first use of contractor-owned & operated all-terrain attack Engines on wildflres for seven government agencies; and has maintained a close and dedicated alliance with the U.S. Forest Service for 45 years. He wrote and published two books, "Fire Lookouts of Oregon & Washington"; and "Fire Lookouts of the Northwest", now in its 3rd edition. He is the founder and present curator of the Fire Lookout Museum, the world’s largest collection of its kind; and continues to serve as the Washington/Hawaii director for the International Forest Fire Lookout Association.

Fire Lookout Museum

During the summer of 2000, the Inland Northwest United States experienced a wildfire season nearly unprecedented in America. 2,150,000 acres burned in Idaho and Montana alone. Fires went days and even weeks before being detected; in many cases because fire lookouts, although standing and serviceable, are no longer staffed. Hundreds of fires were not initially attacked for more than 24 hours; some for as long as a month or more, due to the lack of certified firefighters and overhead supervisory personnel. Some of those fires became the largest; and ultimately the greatest risks to firefighter safety.

A wave of dry lightning events began the middle of July, igniting 200 fires in Idaho and western Montana; soon to be followed by a dozen more such storms thru August. The inevitable end result had been predicted months ahead by fire experts and meteorologists.

Equipment and crews came from across the U.S. and Canada, and as far away as Australia. For a month, the firefighting bill in the West was running at $18,000,000 per day, with professional firefighters earning more than $1,000 a day on standby. It was a bonanza for some; a terrible disaster for others, with losses exceeding $10 Billion.

This study reveals 1¼ million acres burned, that shouldn’t have. $285 Million was spent controlling 93 of those fires; funds that could have been more wisely invested by taking preventative measures to minimize such a natural disaster.

During the 2000 Fire Emergency, U.S. Forest Service Chief Mike Dombeck appealed to those retirees with a career of fire experience to offer their skills in any way they could.

Here is how one person would help. My professional career in Fire spanned 35 years; experiencing almost every type of firefighting hazard, from warehouse basements to high-rise hotels, airplane crashes, and nearly a thousand western wildland fires. Upon invitation, I agreed to conduct this independent study, in co-operation with the U.S. Forest Service* 1; requested by the National Woodland Owners Association*2; and encouraged by wildland fire authorities across America, Canada, and Australia. 

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The purpose of this study is two-fold; to prove the worth of lookouts today and bring back some of these tools of early fire detection, Also, to illustrate the need to restore the principles of early initial attack that were safely applied 40 years ago but have since been replaced by a sometimes impractical, ineffective, and wasteful firefighting policy.

This study was not funded by any government, political, or activist organization. All data was acquired with the co-operation of Fire staff personnel, on-the-scene government and private witnesses, and official records obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.

In the thirty years before World War II, federal, state, and private forest protection agencies developed a system of 3,100 fire lookouts in the Northwest. Many were more than 20 miles beyond the nearest road. When a fire was spotted, the nearest Lookout Fireman often headed out alone, on foot, in the dark of night; sometimes returning to his mountaintop days later to resume the firewatch. Thousands of fires were fought that way. Few ever got away. There were surprising few injuries. Safety First was the policy.

Then came the USFS 10:00 Policy. In short, it meant that every effort be made to bring all fires under control before 10:00AM; taking advantage of the early morning hours when fire behavior is lowest; danger of spread and safety risk is the least. 

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Since "Ten Standard Fire Orders" and "18 Watch Out" rules were adopted, firefighters have memorized and followed them for 50 years; thus ensuring safety on the fireline.

For 70 years, reliable farmers, ranchers, loggers, and communities motivated by an awareness of potential harm, successfully filled the gap when an agency became overwhelmed during a lightning bust. Every car traveling through the forest carried a shovel, axe, and bucket. It was the law. But it was simple instinct and pride in our National Forests that made folks willing and eager to help when needed, whether or not their own property was being threatened. When there was a fire, everybody who worked for the Forest Service became attached to Fire in one way or another.

With the I 990s came a new mental inclination; "forest fires are not all bad"! The pendulum has swung too far. It is clear to those most familiar with actual fire behavior that this new thought process of . . . "Smokey Bear did too good a job" is being carried to extremes. In the 21st Century, you cannot be attempting to restore healthy forests in the Northwest by allowing fire during July & August to reduce excessive fuels. The last thing modern America needs is a Northwest wildfire during a drought!

The "Let Burn" theory eventually led to budget cuts in Fire, that not surprisingly today means fewer lookouts and fewer trained firefighters.

The ‘90s also brought a series of tragedies that killed 150 firefighters. That was far too many. Few, if any, occurred on small fires. It was the loss of 14 men and women on the South Canyon Fire near Glenwood Springs, Colorado in 1994 that impacted Safety First perhaps more than any other single event in the history of firefighting. New safety rules were adopted that in many cases literally prevented firefighters from doing their job.

The Tyee Fire, three weeks later in north-central Washington, was the first of many classic examples. Because available USFS crews did not walk in 1 mile to attack an early evening lightning strike, it became a wildfire that eventually burned 135,000 acres, cost $44 Million to fight, plus $15 Million to rehab. "Safety due to terrain" was the concern. (A 12-year-old lad living nearby had ridden his mountain bike to the origin on several occasions prior to the fire). * 3. A Type-i helicopter was available 2 miles away at

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the time of ignition, but was not used until 3 days later * 3; nor was the also available sheriff department’s helicopter; because USFS inspections were not current. A loaded air tanker made several passes over the fire, but did not drop retardant, when it would have been most effective; due to watershed safety concerns. Bulldozers weren’t used when they could have been effective; due to safety and environmental concerns.* 12.

In the six years that followed, fires would get larger. 12 firefighters would die in 2000.

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In no way does this report intend to compromise Safety First. Reasonable safety concerns are absolutely necessary! Safety at all cost is not. Firefighting, by its very nature, has with it certain risks. Take away every risk, and we might as well stay home.

With the arrival of the 2000 fire season, a USFS policy was in force whereby no one would be permitted to fight fire, even as an initial attack smokechaser, unless they had a current "Red Card" issued in 2000. To get a red card as a basic firefighter meant having to attend 40 hours of Firefighter Training, mostly oriented to Safety. Sessions were seldom extended to the public, due to the work schedules of certified instructors.

By the time the first dry lightning arrived, in July, skilled firefighter crews normally assigned locally, were already on fires elsewhere across the nation. This left but a few to handle the overwhelming task that was to begin with the Clear Creek Fire on July 13.

Many of those left behind had been assigned to non-fire details with deadlines that had to be met. Engine crews were usually not dispatched at night; and in too many cases waited to deliver water from roads, instead of hiking to the fire while it was still small enough to contain with a 3-person hand crew. Far too many USFS employees exercised the option to not become involved with fire activity unless it threatened their own home.’

Of the remaining 600 serviceable lookouts in Oregon. Washington, Idaho, and Montana, only 1/3 were staffed in 2000, even during Red Flag crisis periods. More than sixty of the rest are maintained in top condition, and are currently on the Cabin Rental System, but don’t even have a firefinder anymore. Fires had to await the next scheduled recon flight, or longer, to be detected; sometimes several days late.

The stage was set for disastrous wildfires to occur in the Northwest. The inevitable happened in July and August of 2000. 

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Criticism after any event gains little, unless it can be offered in perspective. So we do not lose track of the events which led up to the 2000 fire crisis, it is important to remember that a relatively new inclination to allow fire to play its natural role had been deeply engrained into the minds of many USFS fire managers by 2000. A three year drought, large areas of insect kill & ice storm debris, and a half century of other natural fuel

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loading were major contributing factors. Eight years of political intervention and Fire budget cuts left little to work with, since funding allocations are not generally made available until fires grow totally out of control.

Firefighters in 2000 generally did an excellent job containing the 5,000 Northwest wildfires that never got big. The vast majority! Few people even knew those fires had occurred, because they were kept small, through quick and efficient initial attack. High praise on their behalf is duly justified.

As we critically review individual fires that did get big, those which might have been handled differently, we hope that only good may come from knowledge learned.

This review deals primarily with fires before the arrival of the first attack crew.

We have selected only those fires that reached more than 100 acres in size. Two hundred large fires in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana were studied. More than half were discarded for the following reasons:

We are aware of the number of small fires within the same locale, the same day, which impacted the large ones; and therefore considered the fact that some fires were beyond reasonable capabilities for safe initial attack from the start, and were possibly destined to become large projects, for reasons beyond human control.

Also, considered was the fact that there were periods of near zero visibility due to smoke inversions from other already large fires; and the lack of resources because of them, particularly during the 8/18 - 8/22 period when 69 fires larger than 1,000 acres were out of control in the West ... the "domino affect".

We have given fair recognition to the fact that these are not the "good old days" anymore, when most people who lived and worked in the woods could be relied upon to work safely on small fires without supervision. However, those rural dwellers who still could be utilized as efficient emergency "co-op" firefighters certainly outnumber the total available fifty years ago.

Precise ignition, detection, attack times, and all other individual fire data were taken directly from USFS Individual Wildland Fire reports, Incident Intelligence Summary (ICS-209) forms, daily Incident Action Plan shift reports, and personal interviews.

For the sake of comprehending the order of events as they occurred, we have sorted fires into their chronological order by ignition date; rather than by agencies or Forests.

After consideration of all the above, it is established with sufficient factual data that not all available capable resources were employed, within the reasonable margins of time and safety, to ensure early detection, attack and containment of the following fires:

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CLEAR CREEK FIRE. Salmon NF; in Wilderness; 26 miles NW of Salmon, Idaho. In the extremely rugged and scenic Bighorn Crags alpine lakes country. Ignition: 7/8/00 16:37 (This, and all Ignition times to follow, is derived from actual Lightning Strike computer records, and Fire Reports). Detected by a backcountry guard 41 hours later. Air was clear & calm. Annual grasses were still green. Although the actual base could not quite be seen from Sagebrush LO, if true to character, down-slope drift smoke from the large burning log and heavy duff could have been seen at dawn on 7/9 or 7/10 from Sagebrush Lookout, 4 ml N (Not staffed). It could have been base sighted from Stormy Peak Lookout, 16 ml NE (Not yet staffed). 09:30 7/10 when detected, this fire was still .1 acre; but by the time all 8 Initial Attack rappellers were in place 2 hours later, it had grown to 3 acres in steep, rocky terrain. At 12:49, the initial attack IC requested retardant, which was readily available, and could have halted this fire. *4 That retardant request was canceled by a Salmon-Challis official, due to a possible threat to water quality & Wilderness "light hand on the land" decision. What would have been a 10 acre fire eventually incinerated 270 square miles of watershed and wilderness. *4 05:00 7/12, it was 124 ac. 05:00 7/13, it was 600 ac. Later that day this fire made an intense 8 mile run to 25,000 ac., and remained uncontained for two months. The Fenster Fire occurred two days later on 7/14, 4 miles NW of Salmon. With 20 homes threatened, it drew heavy priority away from Clear Creek for the next 5 days. Eventually the Clear Creek Complex included the 172,135 acre Clear Creek; and directly affected the size of the 24,639 acre Aparejo, 10,582 ac Shelirock, 6,249 ac Marlin Springs, and 3,356 ac Pine Gulch fires. Total burned: 216.961 acres. Firefighting cost: $71,500,000.

BURGDORF JUNCTION FIRE. Payette NF; 1 mi E of Burgdorf community; 27 miN of McCall, Idaho. Ignition: 7/9/00 02:00. Was not detected until 5½ days later. Escaped near containment shortly after arrival of initial attack crew. Might well have been detected sooner if War Eagle LO (5 ml NE), Hershey Point LO (11 ml W), and Carey Dome LO (8 ml N) had scanned their scene areas at dawn each of these 5 days.Total burned: 64,631 acres, plus 19 structures. Firefighting cost: $21,600,000.

IRON CREEK FIRE. Salmon-Challis NF; I mi from road; 20 miles SSW of Salmon, Idaho. Ignition: 7/11/00 18:00. Detected by a USFS patrolman 19 hours later. Reason for delay not explained. The air was clear. Base area could be seen from Sheephorn Lookout,3 ml SE (Not staffed). Total burned: 150 acres. Firefighting cost: $76,614.

EAGLE POINT FIRE. Bitterroot NF; 18 mi NE of Hamilton, MT. Ignition: 7/12/00 16:00. Reported 23 hrs later ½ acre. Initial attack: 20 hour delay. Minimal other fire activity. Delays not explained. Total burned: 130 ac. Firefighting cost: $285,000.

LITTLE BLUE FIRE. Bitterroot NF; 26 mi SSW of Darby, MT. Ignition: 7/13/00 20:00. Reported within 1 hour by Bare Cone LO when .1 acre. Fire was significantly inactive first 12 hours. Initial attack: 21 hour delay. This fire made an intense run to 2,500 acres the 2~ day. Total burned: 5,900 ac. Firefighting cost: $3,600,000.

7/13 — A mostly dry lightning storm set 82 fires between Seeley Lake, Anaconda, Victor, and Conner in western Montana, after causing 20 fires when it passed through southern Idaho.

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MONTURE/SEELEY LAKE COMPLEX. Lolo NF; E of Seeley Lake, MT. Ignition:

7/13/00 15:00; resulting in the Seeley Lake Complex (30 fires); 2 days later, 30 Seeley Lake fires totaled 180 ac. Upper Monture (9 fires) had an 18 hour delay due to difficult walk-in access and "no helicopter available". 7 days later, the Monture fires were still essentially only monitored, at 120 ac., due to a "shortage of certified firefighters". Local helicopters and firefighters were available, but were not on the Fire Plan. *5 The Monture Complex eventually burned 23,802 acres. Firefighting cost $8.271,000.

7/19, 7/20, 7/22, 7/23, and 7/26 dry lightning storms ignited 300+ new fires in eastern Oregon, eastern Washington, southern Idaho, and western Montana.

ROCKY HULL FIRE. Washington DNR; 3 mi SE of Oroville, Washington. Ignited:

7/22/00 06:15. 1/2 mi from road. Reported to Oroville FD, Olympia DNR operator, Aeneas LO, and DNR Highlands-25 within 20 minutes. Due to DNR Area dispatch out of service until 07:30 on Saturday, and a jurisdiction dispute between DNR & USFS, Initial Attack on the fireline did not occur until after 08:45 (2½ hrs) when fire was 1+ acre. There was no shortage of crews; a DNR 5-Engine strike team from across the state had arrived in the area the day before, for back-up, in anticipation of dry lightning. Only 1 other .1 acre fire was burning on DNR protected land at the time. Air attack by PBY and Ag-Cat was canceled after 1 load each at 09:3 0 when 15 MPH winds began to drive the fire south. 09:30, 10 ac. 11:00,20 ac. 13:00, 1,000 ac.*9.*10. Total burned: 9.404 ac, 37 homes. Firefighting cost: $5.400.000.

In 2000, the Washington DNR staffed only 2 lookouts of 18 still available. *10

HORN CREEK FIRE. Boise NF; 50 mi NE of Boise, Idaho. Ignition: 7/22/00 11:30. Initial attack 12:19 (50 minutes). Nearly contained at 3 acres 12:52 (33 minutes). DC-4 retardant plane w/ 15 mm ETA was ordered, and cancelled 13: 10. H-3 helicopter with bucket arrived; had a 1-minute round/trip from an unlimited water supply (river); was released from this fire at 13:31. Crew became fatigued when wind set spot fires 1/2 hour later. This fire was lost because retardant was cancelled and/or the early release of the heli-bucket. Total burned: 873 ac. Firefighting cost: $1,250,000.

TWIN FIRE. Salmon NF; 30 miles N of Salmon, Idaho Ignition: 7/22/00 18:00. Detected by USFS Air Patrol 15 hours later. Reason for delay: valleys smoked-in by inversion from Clear Creek Fire. Granite LO 7 mi S (Not staffed) might well have seen it soon enough. Fire grew from I acre to 350 acres on 7/23. Total burned: 458 acres. Firefighting cost: $5,425,9QQ.

SPREAD RIDGE FIRE. Lolo NF; 18 mi E of Seeley Lake, MT. Ignition: 7/26/00

23:00. Detected 46 hours later. East Spread LO, 2 mi E (Abandoned Not staffed). Attacked: 61 hour delay. 5 mi from road. Was 20 acres+ when attacked. "No resources available". Total burned: 1,131 ac. Firefighting cost: $919,000.

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CROOKED FIRE. Clearwater NF; US-12 Lob Pass, Idaho/Montana border. Ignition:

7/28/00 09:00. Reported within 5 minutes by Rocky Point LO. Initial attack at once by Rob Truett Logging Co. crew. Cause: exhaust spark. Loggers had this fire nearly under control at ¼ ac. when USFS crews arrived. Fire’s first run was nearly contained when Heli-bucket operations with a 3-minute turn-around time were ordered suspended because it might affect fisheries water quality, The time wasted in 20-minute turn-around from a distant pond attributed to the size and cost of this fire. *6. 7½ sq mi of this watershed was charred black. Total burned: 4,892 ac. Firefighting cost: $5,300,000.

HIDDEN CREEK FIRE. Clearwater NF; in Wilderness; 12 mi SE of Powell, Idaho. Ignition: 7/28/00. Detection 2 days later. Base area could be seen from Hidden Peak LO, 5 ml E (Not staffed), and Grave Peak LO, 7 mi W (Not staffed). Initial attack 3 days after detection. 5 hour hike-in; 5 firefighters. Chainsaws were not permitted. Air support not available, due to Crooked Fire priority. Was 1 1/2 ac. when fire began spotting soon after attack, and was lost.*7. Total burned: 1,724 ac. Firefighting cost: $100,000.

7/30 & 7/31 - dry lightning ignited 30 new fires in southern Idaho; 98 more in Montana.

KITCHEN FIRE. Salmon NF; in Wilderness; 35 ml W of Salmon, Idaho. Ignition: 7/31/00 15:18. Detected & reported 1 minute later by Long Tom LO. Attack delayed due to lack of resources. Became part of the Butts Complex. Total burned: 2,334 ac. Firefighting cost: $50,000.

PARKER FIRE. Salmon NF; in Wilderness; 40 ml NW of Salmon, Idaho. Ignition: 7/31/00 16:00. Detected & reported 15 minutes later from LO. Attack delayed due to lack of resources. Total burned: 1,000 ac. Firefighting cost: $10,000.

FLOSSIE FIRE. Payette NF; in Wilderness; 50 mi NE of McCall, Idaho. Ignition:

7/31/00 1600. Reported within 5 minutes by Sheepeater LO, 2 mi W. Smokejumper and Recon planes over fires (four 1 ac. fires within 5 acre area) 18 hours later & determined it to be no threat therefore no jumpers were deployed. On 8/1, Recon plane reported it was now one 10-acre fire. creeping, still no threat. Three airline pilots hiking 1/4 mi from the origin witnessed the 7/31 storm, aircraft activity but no smoke on 7 31 & 8/1, and the pack string operator who had just supplied a trail crew camped 1 ml NE of origin. Neither he, nor the trail crew had been enlisted for this fire. At 0700 on 8/2, the Jones party flew over the Flossie Fire and photographed it at 10 ac., creeping. * 8. Later that day, the fire escaped and ran to 3,000 ac. Due to heavy smoke from it and other large fires during this period, the CK FIRE went undetected until 21 days later when it had already burned a thousand acres; and the MOORE FIRE, discovered the same day, 4 miles from the LO, was not fought because the Flossie Fire made it unsafe to do so after 8/2. Only suppression activity was to protect structures. Total burned: 80,306 ac., plus 3 structures. Firefighting cost: $150,487.

MUSSIGBROD FIRE. Beaverhead-Deerlodge NF; 12 mi NW of Wisdom, Montana. Ignition: 7/31/00. Reported when under 1 acre. FS Air Patrol not over fire to assess it until 3 hours later when 5 ac.; 15 acres when first attack arrived 5 hours later. Lack of available resources blamed for escape. Why? 3rd day was 4,000 ac. Total burned: 85.000 ac. Firefighting cost: $13,000,000.

MIDDLE FORK COMPLEX. Beaverhead-Deerlodge NF; 30 mi SW of Phillipsburg, Montana. Ignition: 7/31/00. Consisted of Falls Creek, Copper Creek (1.5 ac. when escaped 2nd day). Why 2nd day? Cougar Creek (20 ac. when initial attacked 3^rd day). Why the 3^rd day? Medicine Lake (40 ac. when detected 11^th day in middle of complex); plus 3 other smaller fires. Total burned: 25.000 ac. Firefighting cost: $17.000.000.

7/31 — Dry lightning during a Red Flag alert set more than 100 new fires in the Bitterroot region of SW Montana, resulting in several large complexes that eventually involved 356,000 acres of the Bitterroot National Forest and adjacent state and private lands. 227 buildings were destroyed, including 70 homes.

A domino effect was created when several fires that were not attacked soon enough over-ran other priority fires (near structures).

Several of the large fires are not mentioned in this report, due to insufficient information because requests for information were not answered after the 2nd request. Below are those which should be studied further to establish if they could have been kept under 100 acres:

SULA COMPLEX: (8 MAJOR FIRES). Bitterroot NF; near Sula, Montana. Retardant was not used until late 2nd day, due to Blodgett Fire (priority., structures) near Hamilton. 5,000 acres 3rd day; 12,000 acres 4th day. 49,780 acres and 72 structures burned.

#1 — MAYNARD FIRE. 3 mi W of Sula. Ignition: 7/31 16:50. Reported in 5 minutes from Sula Peak LO at .1 acre. Air support was over the fire 5 minutes later, but low priority, late attack due to other fires near structures. 1 mile walk in. No retardant used. This fire 4 days later over-ran all other fires in Sula vicinity, this fire should have been a high priority, due to next day extreme fire behavior prediction; 1 load of retardant could have held it the first night. *17 Total burned: 45.000 ac. Firefighting cost: $5,000,000.

#2 — LICK CREEK FIRE. 16 mi NE of Sula. Ignition: 7/31 17:30. Reported by Teepee LO when .1 ac. Attacked 17 hours later. Reason for delay: lack of resources. Total burned: 300 ac. Firefighting cost: $75,000.

#3 — GILBERT FIRE. 6 mi NW of Sula. Ignition: 7/3118:00. Reported in 5 minutes from Sula Peak LO at .1 acre. Attacked 37 hours later when 3 acres. Reason for delay: low priority due to other fires near structures. Was later consumed by Maynard Fire. Total burned: 500 ac. Firefighting cost: $ 100.000. 

#5 — MEDICINE POINT FIRE. 6 mi W of Sula; ¼ mi from road. Ignition: 7/31 17:00. Reported 1 1/2 hours later by Sula Pk LO when .1 acre. Attacked 15 minutes later; abandoned 1st night due to other fires of higher priority (near structures). Was later consumed by Maynard Fire. Total burned: 500 ac. Firefighting cost: $10,000.

#6 — FULL CIRCLE FIRE. 8 mi S of Sula; ¼ mi from road. Ignition: 7/31 16:50. Reported 4 days later when .2 acre. Attacked 5thday when 1/2 acre. Delay due to lack of resources; structure priorities. 2 persons could easily have contained any fire that remained at less than 1/2 acre fire for 5 days! Total burned: 900 ac. Firefighting cost: $250,000.

VALLEY/SKALKAHO COMPLEX: (18 MAJOR FIRES). Bitterroot NF; south & east of Hamilton, Montana. Fires were 10,000 acres and mostly still unstaffed the 3^rd day. Eventually charred 282,070 acres, cost $68,000,000 to fight, and burned 155 structures.

VALLEY #1 — TAYLOR SPRINGS FIRE. Ignition 7/31 15:45. Reported 21 minutes later when 2 ac. Attacked 20 hours later when 4 acres. Control was lost after 28 hours when fire ran from 4 to 40 acres. This fire was 2 miles from the nearest road, yet 4 persons walking in could have been on-site before dark the 1st day, and most likely contained it at far less than 4 acres, since it did not run until the 28^th hour! Total burned: 21.487 ac. Firefighting cost: $3,213,367.

VALLEY #2 - TAYLOR SPOT FIRE. 3 mi E of Taylor Fire; 4 mi from nearest road. Ignition: 7/31 15:30. Reported 1/2 hour later at 1/2 ac. Attacked the next day after 16 hrs (8/1 1000) when 4 acres. Was lost after 22 hours (8/1 1600), according to Btrt NF dispatch records. Earlier walk-in attack by 4 persons before dark would have allowed 15 hours to keep this fire under 4 acres. Total burned: 1,450 ac. Firefighting cost: $14,850.

VALLEY #3 — SLATE CREEK FIRE. 2 mi N of Taylor Fire. Ignition: 7/3116:14. Reported 46 hrs later at ¼ ac. Detection delay due to smoke from Taylor fires. Attack delay due to Taylor fires. Total burned: 2,200 ac. Firefighting cost: $297,000.

VALLEY #4 — OVERWHICH FIRE. 1 mi N of Taylor Fire. Ignition: 8/4 16:14. Reported 1 minute later when .1 acre. Never was actively attacked, due to proximity to Taylor fires. Total burned: 600 ac. Firefighting cost: $81,000.

VALLEY #5 — BEAR FIRE. Ignition: 7/31 18:3 5. Reported 5 minutes later when 5 acres. Not attacked until 27 hours later (8/1 2200) when 100 acres. Delay due to low priority because no structures were threatened. No retardant was used until 2^nd day. Control was lost after 45 hours (8/2 1600), according to Bitteroot Dispatch record. This fire eventually consumed other top priority fires. Was near a primary road 15 minutes from Darby; could have been contained at 10 acres if attacked the first hour with reliable resources available in the community. (Not on Fire Plan, not red-carded; could not be used). Control was lost the ₃rd day due to inadequate containment strategy for predicted fire behavior. Most likely would not have been lost if retardant had been used 1st day. *18. Total burned: 145,000 ac., plus numerous structures. Firefighting cost: $35,000.000.

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VALLEY #6 - COYOTE FIRE. 11 mi SE of Darby. Ignition: 7/31 18: _3. Reported 8 minutes later when .2 acres. Never was actively attacked was given a low priority due to the rash of other fire activity threatening structures in the area. Eventually became part of the Maynard & Bear fires. Total burned: 21.198 ac. Firefighting cost: $2,000,000.

VALLEY #7 - PROSPECT FIRE. 1/4 mi from road; 13 mi E of Darby. Ignition: 7/31 18:00. Reported 45 minutes later at 1/2 ac. Attacked immediately and contained at 1/2 ac.; lost control 13 hours later, due to inadequate available resources. Total burned: 9.400 ac. Firefighting cost: $500,000.

VALLEY #8 — WEIRD TOM FIRE. Midway between Bear & Prospect fires, 4 miles apart. Ignition: 7/31 18:00. Reported 45 minutes later at 4 ac. This fire was never actively attacked because of others. Total burned: 300 ac. Firefighting cost: $20,000.

VALLEY #9 — MINK FIRE. 3 mi E of Sula. Ignition: 7/3119:15. Reported within 20 minutes at .1 ac. Attack delay: 59 hours. Reason: "no resources available". Total burned: 670 ac. Firefighting cost: $110,000.

VALLEY #10 — BURKE FIRE. 4 mi E of Darby, Ignition: 7/31 17:00. Reported 16 hours later when 5 acres:, reason for delay unknown. Attacked at 8 acres. Control was lost 6 hours later. Initial attack resources were inadequate for anticipated extreme fire behavior. Total burned: 7,000 ac., numerous structures. Firefighting cost: $1,000,000.

VALLEY #11 — MOOSE RIDGE FIRE. 10 mi E of Darby. Ignition: 8/11 19:00. Reported 17 hrs later when 1 acre. Attack delayed 25 days due to close proximity to Bear Fire, priorities, and safety concerns. Total burned: 160 ac. Firefighting cost: $60,000.

VALLEY #12 — RAZOR FIRE. 28 mi SSW of Darby. Ignition: 8/5 16:30. Detected 8 days later when 15 acres due to smoke from other fires. Attacked on the 9^th day when 50 acres. Delay due to priorities. Total burned: 13.200 ac. Firefighting cost: $1,782,000.

VALLEY #13 — FAT FIRE. 16 mi S of Darby. Ignition: 8/10 16:00. Reported 6 days later when 15 acres. Attacked 22 hours later when 150 acres. Delays due to heavy smoke from other fires; priorities. Total burned: 2.700 ac. Firefighting cost: $364,500.

WILDERNESS COMPLEX: (24 FIRES). Bitterroot NF; Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness; 35 mi SW of Hamilton, Montana. Ignition by lightning 7/30-8/10/00. All but 2 were under 1 acre each after 24 hrs. On the 5th day, 9 went from under 10 acres to 1,200 acres and became project fires up to 20,000 acres, for a total of 44,000 acres burned; and a cost of $1,000,000. Total attack force after 28 days was still only 39 persons (all Overhead monitors). No direct attack: "no resources .. helicopters, firefighters". 

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WILDERNESS #1 — FITZ. Ignition: 7/30 18:00. Detected 21 hours later at 1 ac. Was not attacked. Total size: 1,100 ac. Firefighting cost: $17,600.

WILDERNESS #2— LONELY. Ignition: 7/30 18:00. Reported 1 minute later at Y2 acre by LO. Not attacked. Total size: 19,456 ac. Firefighting cost: $311,300.

WILDERNESS #3— SWET 2. Ignition: 7/3116:00. Reported 1/2 hr later at .2 acre by LO. Not attacked. Total size: 575 ac. Firefighting cost: $9,200.

WILDERNESS #4— HAMILTON. Ignition: 7/31 18:00. Reported 3 hrs later at .2 acre by LO. Not attacked. Total size: 16,770 ac. Firefighting cost: $3 11.000.

WILDERNESS #5— THIRTY. Ignition: 7/31 18:00. Reported 2 hrs later at 1/2 acre by LO. Not attacked. Total size: 5.104 ac. Firefighting cost: $85,800.

WILDERNESS #6 — ECHO. Ignition: 7/31 19:00. Reported 12 hrs later at .1 acre by LO. Not attacked. Total size: 867 ac. Firefighting cost: $13,872.

WILDERNESS #7 — JACK CREEK. Ignition: 8/4 16:00. Reported 1 1/2 hr later at .2 acre by LO. Not attacked. Total size: 803 ac. Firefighting cost: $1,500.

WILDERNESS #8 — LODGEPOLE HUMP. Ignition: 8/5 19:00. Reported 2 hrs later at .1 acre by LO. Not attacked. Total size: 340 ac. Firefighting cost: $5.500.

WILDERNESS #9 — THRONG. Ignition: 8/10 14:00. Reported 26 hrs later at 10 acres. All lookouts (Spot, Salmon, Hells Half) had been evacuated by 8/9. The nearest, Burnt Knob LO, 5 mi SW (Not staffed,), might have seen the base of this smoke when less than 1/2 acre. Not attacked. Total size: 2.295 ac. Firefighting cost: $36,720.

A 5-seat Bell-206 LongRanger-3 helicopter, nearly new, USFS carded, with its certified paramedic, backcountry experienced pilot was offered to the USFS in Missoula, Hamilton, and Darby on 3 occasions; on 6 hour delivery notice. It could have shuttled three firefighters to each Wilderness fire on August 1st or could have rendered valuable assistance on the Sula or Valley fires the Ft day. It was never used. *5

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BOULDER HILL FIRE. Helena NF & DNRC; 5 mi N of Boulder, MT. Ignition: 8/2 14:35. Reported & attacked promptly. Fire made a rapid initial run, but quieted each night to a creep; could have been contained at less than 1,000 acres 1st night. 1st arriving Rural Fire Dept crews with 4 Engines were told by an arrogant I. C. to "go home you are cluttering the road", and banned them from going off the freeway frontage road when they felt they could have safely halted the S & W .spread 3, 000-gallon loads of retardant were cancelled 2 minutes out. * 19. Dozers were not permitted on major portions of the perimeter. *20. Type-II team for 9 days did not fight this fire at night; and pulled everyone off the fire each time it began to heat up around mid-day. * 19. Crews, critically few in number, were prioritized away from this fire. Military firefighters that replaced them were poorly trained *20 As a result, this fire seriously threatened the town of Boulder. From the beginning, the USFS determined by choice of action that this was to become a large and expensive project fire. *19 Total burned: 12,600 ac. Firefighting cost: $4,600,000.

CLEAR CREEK COMPLEX. Flathead Indian Reservation (BIA); SW of Perma, MT. Ignition: 8/3/00. Vanderburg, Divide, Seepay, and Magpie fires. When 13,000 acres the 5th day, these fires still had only 40 firefighters, due to "lack of available firefighters and overhead". Local St. Ignatius & Dixon area basic firefighter red-carded volunteer firemen and useful available contract equipment were never hired *5 Total burned: 20,300 ac. Firefighting cost: $7,600,000.

UPPER NINEMILE COMPLEX. Lolo NF; N of Missoula, MT. Ignition: 8/3-4/00 (26 new fires on Lolo NF; 12 fires on Ninemile RD). Reported 8/4 when .1 to .5 ac., by Stark Mtn LO, Camels Hump LO, Eddy Mtn LO, and Pats Knob LO. 8 fires not staffed 5 days later: Siegal Pass (700 ac.), E.Fk.Beecher (500 ac.), Pats Creek (180 ac.), Grave (1,050 ac), Lower Blue (1,200 ac.), Upper Marion (100 ac.), Siamese (630 ac,), Trio Lakes (30 ac.). Total burned: 24.345 ac. Firefighting cost: $17,000,000.

8/10 - Dry lightning caused 500 new fires in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana.

SHELL ROCK FIRE. Salmon-Challis NF; in Wilderness; 50 mi SW of Salmon, ID. Ignition:8/10/00 12:00. Detected 6 hours later. Base area could have been seen from Bear Creek Point LO, 8 mi SE (Not staffed). Became part of the Clear Creek Complex. Total burned: 74,235 ac. Firefighting cost: $50.000.

RANKIN CREEK FIRE. Salmon-Challis NF; SW of Salmon, ID. Ignition: 8/10/00 19:00. Detected by private aircraft 12 hours later. Base area could be seen from Custer LO, 6 mi E (Not staffed); Lookout Mtn LO, 10 mi S (Not staffed); and Basin Butte LO, 10 mi W (Not staffed). 1 1/2 mi from road. Initial attack was delayed 7 days due to lack of available resources. Total burned: 6,710 ac. Firefighting cost: $3,950,000.

MORSE FIRE. Challis NF; 35 mi S of Salmon, ID. Ignition: 8/10/00 20:00. Detected 12 hours later by a private citizen. Area was not patrolled. No lookouts. Total burned: 5.756 ac. Firefighting cost: $944,200. 

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INDIAN CREEK II FIRE. Payette NF & Challis NF; in Wilderness; 65 mi WSW of Salmon, ID. Ignition: 8/10/00 19:10. Detected 17 hours later. Base area could have been seen from Meadow Creek LO; 3 ml W. (Not in service; smoked-in). Total burned: 2,800 ac. + 9,371 ac. Firefighting cost: $200.000.

SIAMESE LAKE FIRE. Lolo NF; 22 mi S of Superior, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 20:00. Detected 20 hours later. 9 mi from road; 1/2 mi from trail. Not attacked: monitored only for several days, due to proposed Wilderness status. Total burned: 1,350 ac. Firefighting cost: $12,600.

NOSEBAG FIRE. Idaho Panhandle NF; 18 mi NE of Sandpoint, ID. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:00. Detection not until 13 hours later by Air Patrol. Base area could be seen from Lunch Peak LO, 1/2 mi NE (Not staffed). 1 acre when reported; 10 ac. 24 hrs later; 10 other new ignitions in the immediate area, visible from Lunch Peak LO, were detected 12-38 hours after the storm. Minimal attack effort until 8/15 (5^th day). Why? Total burned: 205 ac. Firefighting cost: $634.000.

SHEEP LIGHTNING FIRE. Idaho Panhandle NF; 18 mi E of Sandpoint, ID. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:00. Detection 13 hrs later by Air Patrol. Not attacked until 8/16 (6^th day). Made first 10 acre run 5th day. Total burned: 120 ac. Firefighting cost: $210,000.

LIGHTNING MTN. FIRE. Idaho Panhandle NF; 20 mi E of Sandpoint, ID. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:00, Detection 37 hrs later when 1/2 ac. Base area could be seen from Lunch Peak LO (Not staffed). Minimal attack effort until 8/16 (6^th day) when 50+ acres. Why? Total burned: 180 ac. Firefighting cost: $40.000.

NORTHWEST PEAK FIRES. (6 fires). Idaho Panhandle NF; 40 mi NE of Bonners Ferry, ID. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:00. Detected by Air Patrol 14-16 hrs later when .1 to . 5 ac. each. Within 2 mi of Northwest Peak Lookout (Not staffed). #1 thru #4 within a 20 minute walk from LO. A 6-person LO restoration party camped at the LO were told to leave the area upon approach of the storm on 8/10. #5 and #6 were alongside FS Road-871, a good road closed to preserve grizzly bear habitat, necessitating a 5 mile walk-in. Initial Attack 8/15(5^th day). Total burned: 1.480 ac. Firefighting cost: $1.200.000.

8/10-11. Lightning during the night set 165 fires on the Kootenai NF in NW Montana. All were under .2 acre when detected. Detection delay ranged from :00 to 6 days. Initial attack delay ranged from 1 hour to 17 days. 50 of the 99 Kootenal fires still burning after 7 days still had not been staffed, despite Red Card courses held for co-op firefighters in Libby, Kalispell, & Grangeville I week earlier. 24 fires that eventually grew larger than 100 acres are as follows:

TAYLOR PEAK FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Reported by Keeler Mtn. LO 1 minute later; .1 ac.; 1 mi from paved highway. Initial attack delay: 58 hours. Total burned: 1,311 ac. Firefighting cost: $1,1SO.000. 

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GRAMBAUER FACE FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Reported by Keeler LO within 5 minutes; .1 acre; 1 mile E of Savage Lake community. Initial attack delay: 6 1/2 days. Total burned: 794 ac. Firefighting cost: $357,300.

CLIFF POINT FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 19:00. Reported 4 hours later; .1 ac. Base area could be seen from Webb LO, 4 mi N (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 18 hrs. Total burned: 6,660 ac. Firefighting cost: $1,680,000.

NOSEEUM CREEK FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Was reported 8 hours later; .1 ac.; ½ mi from FS Road-752. Base area could be seen from YaakMtn LO, 3 ml W (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 11 hrs. Total burned: 167 ac. Firefighting cost: $434,000.

O’BRIEN FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT Ignition 8/10/00 22:00. Reported 8 hours later; .1 ac.; 1/8 mi from FS Road-752. Base area could be seen from Yaak LO, 4 ml W (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 11 hrs. Total burned: 226 ac. Firefighting cost: $552,000.

RODERICK SOUTH FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:50. Reported 7 hours later .1 ac. Base could be seen from Lost Horse Mm LO, 6 ml E (Not staffed). initial attack delay: 14 hrs. Total burned: 317 ac. Firefighting cost: $221,900.

KEDZIE CREEK FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Reported 10 hrs later; .1 ac. Base area could be seen from Yank LO, 6 ml W (Not staffed). Near FS Road- 752. Initial attack delay: 11 hrs. Total burned: 229 ac. Firefighting cost: $458,000.

GREEN MTN. #1. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Reported 10 hours later; .1 ac. Base area could be seen from Gem Peak LO, 12 ml W (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 14 hrs. Total burned: 510 ac. Firefighting cost: $2,000,000.

FEEDER MTN. #2 FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Reported 11 hours later by Air Patrol; .1 ac. Near FS Road-2376. Base area could be seen from Yaak LO, 3 ml W (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 5 days. Total burned: 274 ac. Firefighting cost: $356,200.

STUDABAKER DRAW FTRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Reported 11 hrs later .1 ac.; 1/8 mi from FS Road-752. Base area could be seen from Yaak LO, 4 ml W (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 3½ days. Total burned: 165 ac. Firefighting cost: $244,500.

KELSEY CREEK FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:00. Reported 10 hours later .1 ac.; 1/8 mi from road. Area could be seen from Lost Horse Mtn LO, 3 ml NE (Not staffed). Total burned: 2.768 ac. Firefighting cost: $2,491,200.

STONE HILL FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 20:00. Detection delay: 14 hrs; .1 ac.; 1/10 mi from US Hwy-37. Base area could be seen from Webb LO, 3 mi. SE (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 51/2 days. Total burned: 11,115 ac. Firefighting cost: $3,150,000. 

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FAN CREEK FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 19:00. Reported 16 hrs later; .1 ac.; 1/8 mi from FS Road-337. Base seen from Webb LO, 2 ml SE (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 40 hrs. Total burned: 785 ac. Firefighting cost: $210,000.

RUNT FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Reported 14 hrs later .1 ac. Base area could be seen from Garver Mtn LO, 4 ml NE (Not staffed), Baldy LO, 5 ml SW (Not staffed); and Northwest Peak LO, 7 ml NW (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 9 days. Total burned: 423 ac. Firefighting cost: $253,800.

PULPIT MTN. FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Detection: 15 hrs. .1 ac.; 1/2 mi from FS Road-331. Base area could be seen from Yaak LO, 5 ml NW (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 17 days. Total burned: 205 ac. Firefighting cost: $480..000.

UPPER BEAVER FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:30. Reported 14 hrs later; .1 ac.; 1/2 mi fr FS Road-6062. Base area could be seen from Lost Horse LO, 3 ml (Not staffed). Attack delay: 3 days. Total burned: 9,423 ac. Firefighting cost: $5,653,000.

LUCKY POINT FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:00. Detection 15 hrs. .1 acre; 1/8 mi from FS Road-902 (closed). Base could be seen from Baldy LO, 4 ml NW (Not staffed). Initial attack: 9 1/2 days. Total burned: 423 ac. Firefighting cost: $359,550.

LYDIA MTN. FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:00. Detection delay: 16 hrs.; .1 ac. Base area could be seen from McGuire LO, 3 ml W (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 4 days. Total burned: 5.895 ac. Firefighting cost: $1,470,000.

PROSPECT FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00, Reported 18 hrs later. .1 ac. Base area could be seen from Yaak LO, 4 ml W (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 14 days. Total burned: 236 ac. Firefighting cost: $356,800.

FREZKAT WEST FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Reported 19 hrs later; .1 ac.; 1 mi from FS Road-427. initial attack delay: 9 days. Total burned: 166 ac. Firefighting cost: $382,000.

OKAGA FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:OQ Reported 35 hours later, .1 ac. Area could be seen from Mi Heniy LO, 3 ml SE (Not staffed,). Initial attack delay: 17 days. Total burned: 454 ac. Firefighting cost: $408,600.

YOUNG J FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:00. Reported 39 hours later. .1 ac.; alongside FS Road-7202. Base could be seen from Robinson Miii LO, 3 rn SW (Not staffed’). initial attack delay: 31/2 days. Total burned: 875 ac. Firefighting cost: $280,000. 

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LOOP LNF FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 20:00. Reported 4 days later:. .2 ac.; 1/8 mi from road. Base area could be seen from Webb LO, 4 ml NE (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 14 days. Total burned: 635 ac. Firefighting cost: $210,000.

ENGLE FIRE. Kootenai NF, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 23:00. Reported 6 days later .1 ac. Base area could be seen from Gem Peak LO, 12 ml SW (Not staffed). Initial attack delay: 6 1/2 days. Total burned: 225 ac. Firefighting cost: $20,000.

LITTLE PISTOL FIRE. Salmon-Challis NF; in Wilderness; 80 mi SW of Salmon, Idaho. Ignition: 8/10/00 19:00. Detection 19 hours later by Big Soldier LO, 14 mi S. Big Baldy LO, 6 ml NE (Not staffed) might have seen it sooner. Total burned: 63.760 ac. Firefighting cost: $800,000.

NORTON RIDGE FIRE. Salmon-Challis NF; in Wilderness; 50 mi WSW of Salmon, Idaho. Ignition: 8/10/00 19:20. Detected 21 hours later. Base could be seen from Bear Creek Point LO, 7 ml E (Not staffed). Could this fire have been seen earlier from this LO? Ended up as part of the Shellrock Fire. Total burned: 2.880 ac.

LANDOWNER MTN. FIRE. Lolo NF; 6 mi S of Superior, MT. Ignition: 8/10/00 22:00. Detected 5 hrs later .1 ac. Landowner Mtn. LO, 1/8 ml E (Abandoned Historic site). Initial attack delay: 92 hours. Was still less than 1 acre, 14 hours after detection:. 28 acres on 8/12 08:00; 800 acres when attacked on 8/14. 70-yr-old Landowner Mtn LO log cabin and L-4 tower (both eligible for Nat’l Register of Historic Places) burned on 8/17. Had this fire occurred 50 years ago, it would have been extinguished by an 18-yr-old Lookout/Smokechaser who would’ve been back at his LO in time for breakfast. * 10. Landowner #2. 8/11/00 01:00. 2 mi N of Landowner LO, near primary road. Was discovered 1 hour later. Attacked 32 hours later. Total burned: 5.700 ac.. 2 structures. Firefighting cost: $5,200,000.

SHORT CREEK II FIRE. Salmon NF; 40 mi SW of Salmon, Idaho. Ignition: 8/14/00 12:00. Detected 4 hrs later by Middle Fork LO, 6 mi SE. Area was heavily smoked-in. Base could be seen from Short Creek LO, 1 ml SW (Not staffed). Became part of Clear Creek Complex. Total burned: 5,700 ac.

MILEPOST 244 FIRE. Umatila NF; 5 mi SE of Gibbon, Oregon. Ignition: 8/14/00. Detected I day later. Most likely could have been seen sooner from Goodman Ridge LO, 5 ml SE (Not staffed). Total burned: 4,000 ac. Firefighting cost: $2,200,000.

MARLIN SPRINGS FIRE. Salmon & Bitterroot NF; 25 mi NW of Salmon, ID. Ignition: 8/17/00 12:00. Detected 6 hours later by airborne infrared. Lightning strike should have been visible at noon from Blue Nose LO, 5 ml SW (Not staffed). Attacked 2nd day on Bitterroot side, then abandoned by priorities. Attack delay on Salmon side was 17 days due to other fire priorities. Total burned: 6,249 ac. Firefighting cost: $1,500,000. 

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SISTERS FIRE. Bitterroot NF; 5 mi S of Sula, MT. Ignition: 8/17/00 12:00. Detection delay: 7 1/2 hours. Initial attack delay: 9 days due to other fire priorities. Total burned: 200 ac. Firefighting cost: $25,000.

MULE DRY FIRE. Yakama Indian Reservation (BIA); 15 mi. S of Toppenish, Washington. Ignition: 8/23/00. Detection delayed until it became very large, due to sparsely populated open rangeland. Could have been seen sooner from Sopelia LO, 10 mi SW(Not staffed). Total burned: 100.000 ac. Firefighting Cost: $1,600,000.

8/24-25. More new dry lightning activity in eastern Oregon, Idaho, and western Montana.

EASTSIDE COMPLEX. Wallowa-Whitman NF; 40 mi N of Enterprise, Oregon. Ignition: 8/24/00 0600. (11 fires). All remained under 1 acre first 4 hours. All but 1 were detected 5-10 hrs after ignition. No lookouts in service within view. Harl Butte was the only LO staffed in the Hells Canyon area and E half of the Wallowa-Whitman NF 8/24. Red Hill LO (Not staffed); Hat Point (Not staffed, down for the week); Big Butte LO (Not staffed); Grave Point LO (Not staffed); Heavens Gate LO (Not Staffed); Thy Diggins LO (Not staffed). McGraw LO (Not staffed); Russell LO (Not staffed). *11 Total burned: 93,500 ac. Firefighting cost: $6,800,000.

CARROLL CREEK FIRE. Wallowa-Whitman NF & Oregon Dept Forestry; 10 mi E of Wallowa Lake, OR. Ignition: 8/24/00 06:00. Reported within 5 minutes by Harl Bu. LO, 6 mi NE. Was .1 ac. when reported. Was .8 ac. when initially attacked by Helitack crew 1 hour later. Fire escaped helitack crew shortly after their arrival, upon reaching a jackpot of fuel; was 20 acres the next hour. *11. 1,290 acres after 48 hrs (with 8 Engines, 3 Dozers, 2 Helicopters, 6 Water tenders, 267 persons). Total burned: 3,194 ac. Firefighting cost: $2,800,000.

The Carroll Creek fire is a classic example ... "Minutes Count!". 6 fires occurred in the same vicinity at the same time; all were attacked within the 1st hour. 5 were contained at less than 1 acre; #6 most likely would have been if a crew could have been on the scene in 55 minutes, instead of 60.

COLLINS CREEK FIRE. Clearwater NF; 25 mi NE of Pierce, Idaho. Ignition: 8/24/00 11:15. When 2 acres, the 2nd night, all 6 firefighters were pulled off the fire, for safety reasons due to a firefighter shortage, and because snags were present. It was never again staffed. 600 private citizens had completed special "red card" training sessions at Grangeville and elsewhere in Idaho & Montana just a few days earlier. Most were never called to work. *10 Total burned: 374 ac. Firefighting cost: $45,000.

ALDER FIRE. Lolo NF; 12 mi SE of Stevensville, MT. Ignition: 8/24/00 13:50. Discovered 50 hours later when 50 acres. Could have been seen earlier if Bitterroot fires had not become large. Total burned: 5,500 ac. Firefighting cost: $ 1.500,000. 

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The 93 fires in this report represent 46% of the 100 acre+ Northwest fires studied. The other 107 included fires that were destined to be large, due to factors beyond human control. 10% were fires we were unable to obtain sufficient information to include. Some of those fires could add to the 93 which had detection and/or attack discrepancies.

We’ve focused on only 2 major pieces of a puzzle, but the bottom line of this report is: If the indicated lookouts had been able to offer earlier detection, and a reasonable time lapse to initial attack was met by 3-person smokechaser teams, the totals are as follows:

Those $$$ would buy a whole lot of LOOKOUTS, EQUIPMENT, and CREWS!

Crews could re-open many miles of abandoned fire access roads and trails, improve campgrounds, reduce the excess fuel load by thinning, pruning, and prescribed burning; and improve the health of many thousands of National Forest acres in the Northwest.

"Fire Year 2000" arrived July 6, and continued with a dozen dry lightning busts until the 24th of August. On that day, the Governor of Montana closed 20,000,000 acres (21% of the state) to all public entry. This meant 6,400 workers were locked away from their jobs. Virtually every unpaved public road in the western 1/5 of the state was barricaded for the next 11 days. Montana businesses lost more than $270 Million due to the closures. * 13

For several days during August, when an inversion lowered the dense smoke ceiling, firefighting efforts had to be curtailed or suspended due to near zero visibility. Hundreds of fires were 0-20% contained. Some of them were thousands of acres in size. Many were lined up and ready for a wind to explode them across the seven thousand square miles of tinder dry fuels and communities that lay in their path. * 14

Let us present the worst case scenario: But for the grace of God, or purely by good luck (whichever you prefer), a wind didn’t come to create an inferno like none other in modern American history. No amount of lookouts, or people in the woods with their cell phones could have even seen it coming. All of the fire engines in America could not have stopped it. Hundreds or thousands would have died in the evacuation stampede.

The "Red Card" requirement prevented local communities from assisting when their help was desperately needed. Disrespect and hard feelings toward the USFS developed when those with firefighting experience were told their services were not wanted. *10*13 Et. al.

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260+ local casual firefighters, sawyers, and equipment operators were hired; but not until after the situation grew far out of control, and there were already 10,000 people, mostly from other states, on Montana and Idaho fires. Contractors brought their own people and supplies with them. Locals who wanted to help were never employed; including many of those 600 who had obtained their Red Card in special 3-day crash courses. * 16 Et. al. 

Local water tenders, engines, dozers, saws, busses, etc. remained idle throughout the two-month-long Idaho/Montana ordeal. Yet, apparatus came by the hundreds from as far as the Carolinas. Some never even pumped during their whole month on the payroll.*16 

USFS- carded helicopters with certified local paramedic pilots familiar with Montana backcountry flying conditions were never hired, after several offers to the USFS, when the siege of fires erupted, from the Kootenai to the Beaverhead; while other contract helicopters and crews came from as far away as Hawaii weeks later. * 5

At least one local contractor with 3 new 4,000 gallon water tenders operated by red-carded firefighters was told for a third time they were "not needed" the morning before 227 structures burned in the Bitterroot valley. Other red-carded members of area fire departments offered to help, but were never hired.*5

Areas of high public visibility were totally mopped-up by experienced Type-Il crews one day, only to be torched again the next to train the US Army. *10

Like Yellowstone in ‘88, there was too little soon; too much too late. When initial attack firefighters were desperately needed on August 1st, there were none. By the time all the exotic apparatus and management staff arrived two weeks later from the far corners of the nation and globe, their presence was more a political spectacle than a firefighting effort.

Days after the air had cleared and little smoke could be found anywhere, security at the downtown Hamilton fairgrounds Fire Camp was so absurd that a two person team with a combined total of 65 years in Fire, attempting to obtain vital information for this study, could not even get past the uniformed USFS gate guard. Two hours later, they could have fallen in line with tourists led by a tour guide, seen the whole camp, been entertained, and even leave with free souvenirs! * 10

Working relationships between federal & state wildfire agencies, city Fire Department professionals, and rural FD volunteers have improved dramatically the past decade, with the development of strike teams and nationwide emergency mobilization plans. This has come about due to the enormous recent influx of city dwellers moving to the country; bringing with them their urban ideals. They all want their own little piece of privacy; and wooded surroundings offer that best, However, most don’t even have a clue how to protect themselves, or choose to ignore the hazards and the problem. As a result, they are the problem. They pay no taxes for fire protection on their structures; yet when their home is even remotely threatened, retardant bombers, at a cost of $9,000 a load, and other expensive firefighting efforts are prioritized for their behalf. Structure protection  has become the top priority for even the Forest Service; often at the expense of losing thousands of acres of valuable forests, watersheds, and other resources. 

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It is not Urban Interface; but Rural Interface. Rural homeowners need to learn how to protect their own life and property; and pay to establish a Rural Fire District; or be prepared to suffer the consequences. Only when that controlling voice from Urban America is resolved, will wildfire agencies again be able to do the job they’re meant for .. to protect our natural resources. 

However, if the agency has not made every reasonable effort toward early detection and attack, it is on very shaky legal ground for huge lawsuits when homes and lives are lost. 

A positive and very good example of fire management in the inland Northwest is the Clearwater-Potlatch Timber Protective Assn.; a wildland fire agency responsible for protecting one million acres of private timberland in a region prone to frequent lightning adjacent to the Clearwater NF in Idaho. C-PTPA has been around for a very long time; ever since 1902. Operating with a sound theory that ... "Small woodland owners can only afford small fires", the development of numerous man-made ponds, twice daily air patrols, lookouts, and an aggressive initial attack policy, this agency’s largest fire in the past decade was less than 20 acres. *22 

The bottom line, illustrated in this report, is Early Detection and Early Initial Attack. 

Early Detection. Lookouts are not the total answer; nor are twice-daily air patrols. Neither are people in the woods with a cell phone every mile. Alone, all three have flaws. Together, the three are the best we have available. Fire detection by satellites is out of the question today; contrary to what the general public is led to believe. 

Lookouts can see every hill and nearly every valley, from dawn ‘til dark. At daybreak, when lightning sleeper fires (the most dangerous of all) are most apt to leave their telltale pocket of drift smoke low above the treetops and in the draws, only the lookouts will be there to see it before it typically dissipates the first few minutes after sun-up. Will it show up again at just that minute when Air Patrol could catch it? Not likely. 

Of the 93 case histories revealed in this report, a significant delay in detection was one of the two greatest factors determining whether it would be a simple 3-person fire, or become an expensive project or campaign effort. 

It can be assumed by the data shown above, that most of these 93 fires would have been reported before they escaped the safe control capabilities of 3 persons, if those lookouts indicated had been staffed in July & August, 2000. 

Yet, in all the forthcoming 100 % MEL additional funding for the 2001 fire season, as a result of last year’s fires, little or none has been earmarked for additional lookouts. 

Early initial Attack. Nearly every case we’ve reported could have been prevented, if willing and capable private citizens had been recruited, when necessary. Additional  funding promised for the 2001 fire season suggests an average of only 6 additional firefighters per district. That won’t buy much during a lightning bust.

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Early Detection. Every lookout which is still intact and servicepble, but no longer staffed by Fire, should be restored to service, at least during Red Flag events, during and after lightning, and other periods of high fire danger.

Sixty lookouts are now in the Cabin Rental System; in top condition. Yet, most of them no longer even have a firefinder. Fire managers have discarded these lookouts as a tool, and are wasting their best opportunity. It should be understood that recreationists who rent lookout cabins, in the event of unusual fire conditions, might have visitors on official business for extended periods, or might necessarily have their stay interrupted.

A list of Emergency LO staffers should be maintained on the District fire plan. They could be drawn from district employees who cannot, or do not wish to obtain a Red Card, but are fully capable, already know the seen area, and are efficient at relaying radio traffic. Lightning often shuts down radio repeaters. Lookouts are the best back-up communications link when repeaters fail, which occurs frequently due to lightning.

Many mountaintop lookouts have someone living nearby who has either once manned them, or would be fully capable and willing to do so on short notice during Red Flag fire weather events. They could be the best lookouts, for they are already familiar with the area. Enlist them; train them; put them on the District fire plan; and use them.

Early Initial Attack. Without it, lookouts, air patrols, and every other means of detection are virtually useless. Almost every year, somewhere in the Northwest, there will be at least one severe weather event during high risk periods that will cause hundreds of fires in a single day. Forty years ago, local residents helped out as soon as agencies became overwhelmed. They should still be able to.

The Red Card is good; and has been for 50 years. So was the Blue Card, issued to non-agency individuals willing to assist as smokechasers and emergency firefighters.

Agencies need to conduct condensed training programs locally, modified to their needs, on weekends or evenings early in the fire season, to enable those who wish to obtain a card. Place them in 3-person teams on the District fire plan; and call them when needed.

The 10:00 AM Policy. Re-establish this 70-year-old rule to make every effort within all reasonable safety measures; to contain every wildfire before 10:00 AM, when fire behavior is generally least active. Take the fullest advantage of the quiet hours between dawn and 10:00 AM on every fire. Today’s fire crews generally don’t arrive on the fireline to begin their productive workday until almost 10:00. They return to Fire Camp eight hours later, wasting the evening hours when direct attack is again most effective. The bigger the fire gets, the more profound this schedule becomes. 

On large fires, establish an overlapping daylight workday schedule, if and when it is no longer deemed safe for firefighters to work in the dark. "A" Shift is on the fireline from 05:00-13:00; "B" Shift is on the fireline from 11:00-19:00; an 8 hour workday, with a 2 hour overlap of fire crews on the line during the hours of greatest potential need. 

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22

There will be those who would interpret this report to place too little regard for safety on the fireline. Yet, the facts tell it like it was. It does NOT compromise reasonable safety.

Some will insist wildfire is ideal for forest health in the West. Even after Yellowstone. Los Alamos. And the Bitterroot.

When $1.6 Billion was spent fighting wildland fires in 2000 alone, it will be difficult to convince some of those who depend upon wildfires for their own economic gain, that there were gross errors that contributed to the eventual size and cost of these 93 fires.

What about the $10 Billion in economic losses from the 2000 wildfires? What about the hundreds of human lives that were put at risk, and had to be evacuated, when some of those fires grew so large that they were for many days totally out of control?

There are still 40 million acres left, that, according to experts, are at risk of catastrophic fires. Will there be a Firestorm 2001? ... or will 2002 be The Year the West Burned? Will it happen next in Washington or Oregon? Idaho? ... or all over again in Montana?

Until we learn to incorporate today’s knowledge and state-of-the-art tools with those of years ago — lookouts for the earliest possible detection, and the shovel & pulaski smokechaser — it is not a matter of will it happen; but WHERE? ... and ... WHEN?

In this review, we have revealed facts that focus on two major pieces of the complex puzzle... what happened BEFORE the first firefighters arrived.

Some, with more knowledge than I, and closer to the fire organization today, might strongly disagree with this report. Fine! Let them come forth with their set of facts. Toss in Fuels. Weather. Topography. Fire Behavior. Staffing. Safety. Policies. Politics. Regulations. Forest Health. Urban Ideals. Environmental Concerns. *21

Then, present it to the American taxpayers to contemplate. 

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* 1 ...Mike Dombeck, Chief, USDA Forest Service; 8/15/00 letter. RK 9/11/00 reply. Dale N. Bosworth, Regional Forester, Northern Region USFS, 8/21/00 letter. Jose’ Cruz, Director, Fire & Aviation Mgmt., USDA Forest Service; 10/16/00 ltr.

*2 ...Dr. Keith A. Argow, President, National Woodland Owners Assn; 9/11/00.  

*3 Bockoven & Lohse families, Ardenvoir, WA; interviews by RK 11/13/94.

*4 Paul Ross, Clear Creek Fire IC; Joe Carveiho, FMO, Salmon, ID; RK 11/00.

*5 ____^, heli pilot/paramedic, St. Ignatius, MT; interviews by RK 2/5/01 Et al.

*6 ____^Truett Logging Co. operators, Lolo, MT; interviews by RK 9/7/00.

Ian Christie, Crooked Fire IC, Victoria, Aus.; interviews by RK 9/7, 10/30/00

____^ heli pilot, Hillcrest Helicopters, Lewiston, ID; interview by RK 9/8/00.

*7 Chris Ourada, FMO, Powell Ranger Dist., ID; interview by RK 9/7/00.

*8 Ken Jones, Washougal, WA; interviews by RK 12/00 Et a!.

*9 Bob Hilderbrand, reporting party, Oroville, WA; interview by RK 8/28/00.

*10 ..Ray Kresek, Spokane, WA.; oral accounts from witnesses (numerous).

*11 ...Jacqueline Moreau, Hart Bu. LO, OR; interview by RK 11/00.

*12 ...Wenatchee World newspaper; 8/94 Et at.

*13 ... Missoulian newspaper; 8/24, 8/31/00.

*14 ... US Forest Service daily Fire Situation Reports; many; from internet.

*15 ... Don Shearer, rancher, Phillipsburg, MT; in Washington (DC) Times.

*16 ... Missoulian newspaper; 8/19, 8/20, 8/31/00 Et al.

*17 ...____^ Bitterroot NF initial attack firefighters (6); interviews by RK 9/4 Et.al.

*18 ...____^ Btrt NF staff member, Hamilton, MT; interview by RK 2/8, 2/23/01.

*19 ...____^Fire Chief, Boulder, MT; interview by RK 2/26/01.

*20 ...____^Boulder Fire Safety Officer; interview by RK 3/14/01.

*21 ...____^A District Fire Mgmt Officer, USFS, Region-I; interviews; many; by RK.

*22 .. Howard Weeks, Chief Fire Warden, C-PTPA, Orofino, ID; interviews by RK.

A (Names withheld as per the Privacy Act to protect their professional career)

We welcome comment from anyone with additional information that would contribute toward the study of these or any other large fires occurring during 2000 in the Northwest. 

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RAY KRESEK began his career in Fire in 1954, as a firefighter, lookout, and later as a state fire warden for the Washington Dept of Natural Resources for 5 years. He served 4 years with the U.S. Air Force Fire Dept, in aircraft crash rescue; earned college degrees in Forestry and Fire Science; and retired after serving 25 years with the Spokane Fire Dept, as an Engine company officer for 18 years. He was a fire equipment contractor for 20 years, pioneering the first use of contractor-owned & operated all-terrain attack Engines on wildflres for seven government agencies; and has maintained a close and dedicated alliance with the U.S. Forest Service for 45 years. He wrote and published two books, "Fire Lookouts of Oregon & Washington"; and "Fire Lookouts of the Northwest", now in its 3rd edition. He is the founder and present curator of the Fire Lookout Museum, the world’s largest collection of its kind; and continues to serve as the Washington/Hawaii director for the International Forest Fire Lookout Association.

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